hendrix
Well-known member
I know he's saying that they do exist. He's saying that because human values are subjective, objective values can't exist without god. I'm saying that's faulty logic. Just because our values are subjective doesn't mean that objective values don't exist - we just probably can never fully know them. Again, that's the difference between epistemology and ontology.He's not saying they don't exist. He is saying they do. He is saying that without god or some thing/concept like god we cannot have objective morality. This is in line with our previous discussions on natural rights. Otherwise, the objective rights are only illusory as far as our reason dictates - but in reality this is still the subjective reasoning of a human. In a sense, objective morality requires objective perception. God as the ideal good is the objective standard with which we relate these values.
I'm not sure how far that implication is useful for this discussion but it's a technicality that is quite true when you think about it.
Objective morality can exist even if we don't have objective perception. Our perception will always be flawed (but improving as much as we can) and we can use our relativistic measures as best as possible while understanding their flaws.
OK I think there might be a language barrier here so I'm going to try to break down for you what mean when I say "meaning", "value". Meaning is not the same thing as values. Values are not the same thing as meaning. These words do not mean the same thing.You are playing games with words. Meaning, values, these are all qualitative distinctions we are giving to ideas and actions. Nihilism = no objective quality exists or at worst cannot be shown to exist even if they do. Nihilism is essentially useless. It is not going to aid you in the discovery of objective values. You seem not to realise you are using epistemology for the ontological
A number is a value. There are objectively three apples in my fruit bowl right now - the epistemological deficits being how can I trust my eyes and is time really now etc etc etc - whatever things make it impossible to actually fully know something in truth. So while I can't actually know the value, there still exists an objective value. Relativists might dispute this. But the point being, just because I can't actually know something, doesn't mean that it doesn't objectively exist.
Now, how might this apply to objective morals?
Well, I don't believe that "true morality" exists, in that morality is a human construct. But that doesn't mean that morality has to be purely relative.
However, if we define morality as a something - say morality is when x occurs and y doesn't occur. Now if x occurs and y doesn't occur tomorrow - then that was objectively moral, even if we did not have the knowledge or the capacity to observe of measure it.
Finally, I do think that different morals are applicable in different circumstances and time - but I am not saying this from a relativist perspective - instead I am saying that our definition of what's moral simply is not a comprehensive one (and probably will never be). So not only are we not able to know what's moral, we're also unable to define completely what morality is, due to not being able to consider an infinite array of circumstances. In other words it is our epistemological deficit preventing the discovery of objective values. The existence or non existence of a god is irrelevant.
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